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 Chapter 1 
The Richness of CONNEX Research  
in a Nutshell 
 
Beate Kohler-Koch 
MZES, University of Mannheim 
 
 
 
 
In order to do justice to the complexity of EU governance, research was 
organised in six Research Groups each approaching the ‘problematique’ of 
efficient and democratic multi-level governance from a different perspective. 
Researchers addressed the institutional architecture of the EU system as well 
as the nature and effects of old and new instruments of governance. They put 
the ways and means of enhancing democracy in the EU system under 
scrutiny and examined the gains and challenges of civil society participation. 
By bringing together a multi-disciplinary and multi-national group of scholars 
the diversity of approaches came to the fore and added to a highly 
differentiated picture of the European governance system. The productivity 
of CONNEX is manifest in an impressive publication output.1 The richness 
of research findings is visible in the summary reports of the individual 
Research Groups which are documented in the second part of this chapter. 
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The CONNEX contribution to the academic debate  
Even though leading scholars in the field have attested CONNEX to already 
have an imprint on the academic debate, it is still too early for a validated 
“impact assessment”. Only in the long run it will become manifest whether 
new insights have spread beyond the network or even have become common 
knowledge and whether shifts in methodology and theoretical conceptions 
emanating from CONNEX inspired subsequent research. For instance we 
have to wait and see if scholars will expand on the de-mystification of the 
New Modes of Governance and heed the advise to engage in a regular 
dialogue between policy studies specialists and scholars working on issues of 
politics and accountability to better assess the efficiency and democratic 
legitimacy of different modes of EU governance.  
Furthermore, we have to look for the spreading of research questions 
and concepts. For example, will the academic community take up on the 
‘normalisation’ of the Commission as a core executive and further investigate 
how the sectorisation of executive politics transcends levels of governance? 
Will they operate with the concept of ‘double-hatted agency’ to better grasp 
the role of national agencies in the emergent European administrative space? 
Will they follow the proposition that we should not be content with proxies 
such as ‘access’ and ‘inclusion’ to measure influence but aim at scrutinizing 
the capacity of different actors to have an impact on policy outcomes? And 
will the suggested methodological approach stand hold against critical 
evaluations? CONNEX was very much occupied with the normative 
implications of EU governance. Accountability in multi-level, network 
governance was a core issue and sustainability would suggest that the 
consensus definition arrived at in Research Group 2 would spread beyond the 
community of CONNEX researchers. It can also be expected that the 
pragmatic research strategy developed in CONNEX will be followed that is 
to transform the different conceptions of democracy into a number of 
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empirically identifiable "yardsticks" that can be used for assessing the 
democratic credentials of EU governance.  
Apart from conceptual input CONNEX has added to our empirical 
knowledge and paved the ground for a review of some conventional wisdom 
concerning the EU. CONNEX research has displayed that the development 
of new modes of governance does not announce a demise of the Community 
method. It is applied today in a larger number of areas than fifteen years ago 
and there has been no substantial decline of the volume of legislative 
initiatives, even after the enlargement. Legal integration has not stopped, 
even in areas where the need for diversity is acutely felt, such as social policy. 
Furthermore, for the assessment of democratic representation it is important 
to know that many worries set off by the accession of the twelve new 
member states are unfounded. It is well documented now that enlargement 
did not markedly increase the heterogeneity of the European electorate nor 
did it undermine the functioning of EP elections or the operation of party 
groups in the EP. It also did not affect the cohesiveness and distinctiveness of 
the EP groups on either the left-right or the EU dimension. Even where old 
and new member states differ as it is the case in accepting the consequences 
of European citizenship, the support of European unification or with respect 
to mutual trust such differences may not be long-lasting since attitudes can 
well be explained by utilitarian considerations and, consequently, will change 
with benefits gained from the EU. 
Whereas on balance the conditions for elections, parties and the 
working of parliaments look brighter than expected, CONNEX dampened 
the hope that civil society and NGO involvement in EU governance may 
redress the democratic deficit of the EU. Notwithstanding all the efforts to 
widen participation by lowering the threshold of access, by increased 
transparency and support given to weak interests, the Commission’s new 
‘consultation regime’ did not level out unequal representation, neither in 
terms of types of interests nor in relation to territorial origin. All in all, the 
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prospects for a more effective engagement of civil society in EU governance 
are bleak. Empirical evidence underscores that civil society organisations have 
a very limited capacity to enhance meaningful political linkages between the 
EU and its citizens. The readiness to engage with the EU is relatively weak 
exactly among the group of citizens that the social capital model predicts would 
be highest – members of voluntary associations. Consequently, bottom-up 
engagement that reaches up to the EU level is unlikely to emerge. The 
professionalization and bureaucratization of NGOs appears to be inevitable if 
general interests are to be voiced effectively and thus the ‘iron law of oligarchy’ 
may be confirmed once more. Sustainability would be achieved if future 
research would engage in comparative studies to scrutinise the transformation 
of NGOs when operating in the multi-level system of the EU.  
A more detailed picture of the research resulting from the six Research 
Groups is presented in the following paragraphs.  
Main findings by Research Groups 
For the Final Conference each Research Group Coordinator produced a 
synthesis of the research results emanating from the many joint activities.2  
 
Institutional Dynamics and the Transformation of European 
Politics 
(Morten Egeberg, ARENA, University of Oslo) 
RG1 research has centred on the question how the executive branch of 
government actually works in a multi-level system like the European Union. 
Against this background, one team has examined how institutional and 
organisational features of EU executive bodies and their inter-institutional 
arrangements might impact on politico-administrative behaviour (policy-
making and -implementation). A key concern was to understand the 
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institutional/organisational conditions under which executive behaviour 
might transcend an intergovernmental logic, so that a multi-dimensional 
pattern of cooperation and conflict emerges. Furthermore, researchers looked 
at how institutional and organisational features of EU executive bodies 
themselves change. What are the scope conditions for purposeful reform? 
Which role does crises, contingent events, path dependence, imitation and 
intergovernmental bargaining play in processes of change? 
Another team has dealt with implementation of EU policies at the 
national level. In addition, the team has concentrated on the particular 
conditions created by the EU enlargement. In order to explain adaptation and 
implementation, it has looked at the role of national administrative 
traditions/culture, external incentives, administrative capabilities, bureaucratic 
qualities and attention and motivation among executives. 
Executive centre formation at the European level 
In dealing with administrative bodies and networks within the EU it turned 
out to be wise to differentiate more clearly between at least two separate roles 
that national executives play: When they contribute to the Commission’s 
policy preparation work and are held responsible for the implementation of 
EU policies, they, arguably, can be seen primarily as ‘partners’ in the 
‘Community (or Union) administration’. When national administrations, on 
the other hand, participate in the Council’s legislative activities, they are not 
part of what we reasonably can denote as the ‘Community (or Union) 
administration’. 
We think we see a kind of ‘normalisation’ of the Commission as a core 
executive over time: the college has clearly become a genuinely political, 
rather than technocratic body, something which is reflected in its 
composition, its ever closer relationship to the European Parliament and the 
recognition of commissioners’ right to also play a party political role (Egeberg 
2006; Kassim and Dimitrakopoulos 2006; Cini 2007; Wille 2007). The 
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services, on the other hand, have been increasingly based on permanent 
positions filled by persons recruited by the services themselves on a merit 
basis. Inter alia, less interference from the political level in appointment 
processes and officials’ careers means that the Commission administration has 
moved closer to the Scandinavian or British model, in contrast to in the past 
when its continental origin was more visible (Balint, Bauer and Knill 2008; 
Egeberg 2006; Wille 2007). As in national governments, politics at the 
Commission seems to be very much politics among departments arranged by 
sector or function, rather than by geography (Egeberg 2006). Nationality 
does not seem to explain very much about the Commission officials’ 
information networks or loyalties (Suvarierol 2008; Trondal 2006; 2007). 
‘Normalised’ patterns of executive politics might at least partly be accounted 
for by organisational factors (such as sectoral and functional specialisation) and 
inter-institutional dynamics (such as the relationship to the European 
Parliament), although more research is certainly needed to substantiate the 
findings.  
Challenges faced by the Commission 
The Commission, however, has to compete with the Council over some 
executive functions, particularly in the areas of CFSP and ESDP. The part of 
the Council secretariat dealing with these areas has developed into a more 
typical executive body than the rest of the secretariat, a development which 
was partly triggered by external events (Christiansen and Vanhoonacker 2008; 
Vanhoonacker and Duke 2006). By integrating and coupling policy fields, the 
Commission might be more capable of ‘keeping its competences’ (Lenschow 
and Reiter 2007). Contrary to what has often been argued, the Open 
Method of Coordination (OMC) does not necessarily side-track the 
Commission: our studies indicate that aspects of the Community Method 
may invade the OMC, so that in general we cannot speak of an 
‘OECDisation’ of the EU in this respect (Gornitzka 2007). On the other 
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hand, extensive management reforms in the Commission services may lead to 
less attention available for policy innovation in the institution (Bauer 2008).  
“Double-hatted” national agencies – Towards a multi-level Union administration 
The peculiar division of labour (at the international level) between the 
Council of Ministers and the Commission is expected to trigger centrifugal 
forces within national executives, since the Commission, being in charge of 
policy preparation and implementation but not having its own agencies at the 
sub-territorial level, looks out for partners in these respects. Suitable partners 
may be found among national regulatory authorities organised at arm’s length 
from ministerial departments rather than among ministries which in a sense 
belong to the ‘Council pillar’. We, therefore, operate with the concept 
‘double-hatted agency’ in order to denote national agencies that may in a 
sense serve both, national ministries and the Commission (Egeberg 2006). 
The extent to which ministries or the Commission play a significant role in 
steering the implementation activities of national agencies depends on several 
factors; for example, ministries’ and the Commission’s organisational capacity 
and competencies have been shown to be important (Bulmer et al. 2007; 
Gornitzka 2008; Martens 2006; 2008; Sverdrup 2006). Agencies in new 
member states seem to be more receptive to Commission influence, probably 
due to their novelty in the EU arena (Martens 2008). Also, national agencies, 
when practising EU legislation, cooperate and coordinate with ‘sister 
agencies’ in other countries, often in networks. In that sense they are more 
‘multi-hatted’ than ‘double-hatted’, although horizontal networks are 
probably not as important as the vertical relationships with the respective 
‘parent ministries’ or the Commission (Egeberg and Trondal 2007). In a 
similar vein, direct relationships between the Commission and regional 
authorities, partly by-passing national governments, are observable, not least 
in regionalised states like Spain (Morata 2007).      
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Explaining variation in implementation practices 
Most students of the implementation of EU policies at the national level do 
not seem to have taken into consideration the extent to which networks or 
other ways of organising executive functions across levels of governance 
make a difference as regards actual implementation. Instead, the centre of 
attention has been on the role of national administrative traditions. 
Concerning new member states, the crucial role of external incentives has 
also been strongly emphasised. Contributions from our group confirm such 
findings but, they have added new insights on the important role that 
Commission competences, national administrative capabilities, bureaucratic 
qualities and attention and motivation among the executives at the national, 
regional and local level play for implementation outcomes (Bulmer and 
Burch 2005; Esmark 2008; Fernandez 2006; Knill and Hille 2006; Knill and 
Winkler 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2006; Sverdrup 2006). It has 
also been shown that concerns about one’s international reputation might 
affect the willingness of governments to comply (Knill and Tosun 2008). 
Studies of ‘twinning projects’, the practice of seconding experts from 
experienced member state administrations to new member states, indicate a 
potential learning effect as regards implementation practices (Tomalova and 
Tulmets 2007). Thus, twinning can be seen as one of many instruments used 
in building a European administrative space.   
Theoretical lessons 
On the theoretical level, Research Group 1 has contributed to our 
knowledge about how institutional/organisational features, such as the forms 
of specialisation and organisational capacity, might affect politics and policies. 
For example, the sectoral and functional structuring of the Commission tends 
to bring sectoral and functional conflicts to the fore, thus complementing and 
partly displacing the inherited intergovernmental (territorial) pattern of 
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executive politics. This is important, since relocating lines of conflict in a 
political space redistributes power and, thus, eventually affects policy outputs. 
The sectorisation of executive politics within the Commission also transcends 
levels of governance by linking up sectoral and functional counterparts of 
national administrations, as well as of interest groups. In addition, the 
existence of the Commission as a separate executive body outside the 
Council (i.e. functional specialisation between institutions) brings in inter-
institutional conflicts not found in IGOs, particularly in relation to the 
Council. Such conflicts do not remain contained at the EU level, either. It 
has been shown that, due to institutional change at the national level 
(“agencification”), new patterns of cooperation and conflict among executive 
bodies across levels of governance take place: thus, while the Council 
basically “links up” national ministries, the Commission tends to deal with 
national agencies that are key actors as regards policy implementation and, to 
a certain extent, also as regards policy preparation. 
Democratic Governance and Multilevel Accountability 
(Deirdre Curtin, University of Utrecht) 
RG2 focused on an enhanced understanding of the nature of the European 
Union. A pertinent question was if we better compare the EU and its various 
rule-making processes with what happens in the national contexts and their 
constitutional and political systems or if it would be more appropriate to 
analyse the EU as a highly sophisticated international organisation that can be 
compared to other international organisations. From this comparative 
perspective the problems of analysing accountability and democracy in the 
EU multi-level context has been scrutinised. In the beginning it was open to 
debate if it would be possible to agree on a common definition that would 
cut across strong national democratic traditions both institutionally and in 
terms of underlying values. The Research Group was just as engaged in 
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clearing theoretical concepts and as in advancing our knowledge by empirical 
analysis: Are notions of democracy and accountability contested when moved 
beyond the realm of territorial states? How can we best conceptualise 
‘accountability’ in order to study it empirically? Is a restricted meaning of 
accountability helpful in elucidating accountability practices in the EU multi-
level governance context? What do we find in terms of accountability 
practices in the EU multi-level governance context? How does accountability 
operate in a complex system such as that of the EU? What mechanisms 
enforce accountability and in what areas are accountability mechanisms 
problematic? 
Understanding the nature of the European Union 
The issue of the nature of the European Union is a fundamental question 
with important implications for the study of these concepts. After all if one 
views the EU as simply another international organisation (albeit more 
institutionalised and more inclusive in terms of the scope of the issue areas dealt 
with) then the discussion on democracy and accountability can be quite different to 
viewing it in terms of an evolving and autonomous political system. In the 
international organisation perspective then ultimately democracy is assured through 
the national political process, supplemented by some weaker forms of politicisation 
at the European level. Legal and administrative accountability could then be 
considered ample in terms of this perspective.  
The further call for more democracy and accountability stems from the 
EU’s development into a political union, whose policies go far beyond the 
original aims of eliminating barriers to cross border economic activities. The 
EU has evolved over the years from an atypical international organisation to a 
polity with many state-like features. The EU polity has expanded almost to 
the point that there is virtually no area of political or social life that is potentially 
not within its remit. This includes the purely regulatory to the redistributive to 
almost everything in between. The EU has built up a considerable body of 
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independent policy and regulation in fields like environmental protection, 
consumer protection, occupational health and safety. In addition, the EU has 
branched out to include issues such as immigration policies, justice and home affairs 
and a common foreign and defence policy. The proliferation of activities has 
strengthened the call for democratic decision-making and democratic 
accountability of European policy makers. 
If the EU is viewed as a political system in its own right, albeit of a 
special kind, then the issues of democracy, representation, accountability etc. 
must be discussed and fleshed out at that level as well in relationship with the 
national level. Yet when we look at the EU and compare it to other political 
systems in the post-industrial world the most striking point is the absence of 
politics in the sense of responsiveness in terms of elections, parties and the 
conventional procedures of popular democracy (Mair, 2007). There are 
therefore different levels to the so-called democratic challenge: one at the 
level of the EU political system itself; secondly at the level of the national 
political system and thirdly the often intricate inter-actions between the two. 
This description already indicates that there is unlikely to be a single solution 
for Europe’s democratic challenge at any level since national democracies are 
not only different but have been affected in critically different ways by 
ongoing processes of European integration. 
Problems of analysing accountability, democracy and legitimacy in the EU multi-level 
context 
Much of the work that has taken place in the context of RG2 seems to 
implicitly depart from the view that the EU can be analysed in terms of its 
own political system albeit one that is both multi-level and not fully 
developed. Issues of democracy and accountability, representation and 
legitimacy have firmly established themselves at the centre of the debate on 
the future evolution of the EU. The problem is that in practice concepts such 
as democracy, democratic accountability, representation etc. are not only 
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contested at that level but have in practice been filled in a manner that only 
compares very weakly with national counterparts and national traditions 
(Wiener 2007). The study of accountability, democracy, representation and 
legitimacy in the EU context is complicated by the fact that the EU’s 
member states present an enormous diversity in democratic traditions, both 
institutionally and in terms of underlying values. This diversity has only 
increased with the accession of the new member states. Therefore, it is not 
possible simply to transpose existing democratic institutions to the European 
level.  
In order for a sense of democratic legitimacy to exist it is argued that 
there must be a basic system of electoral accountability with a match between 
the level decisions are being taken and the level to which the electorate can 
in the final analysis hold the decision makers to account (Mair, 2007). This 
does not exist in the EU. The absence of a real electoral contest fought out 
on European issues hampers the opportunities of citizens to hold MEPs 
accountable for their actions. In the evolving political system of the EU it is 
clear that it lacks the kind of integrated public sphere and civil society that 
sustain democracy and accountability in the nation states. On the other level, the 
EU’s institutions fall short of standards of democracy and accountability: popular 
representation play only a minor role in many policy areas and mechanisms of 
accountability are not always well-developed. In addition, the EU’s policy making 
system as well as its political system is not transparent which prevents effective 
democratic control and accountability. 
Solutions to these perceived problems are compounded by the 
multilevel character of the EU and the diversity of the member states. The 
EU no longer undertakes activities or attempts problem solving within the 
formal remit of its formal institutions but also in a host of other looser, often 
less institutionalised forums, especially (policy) networks (Benz 2007; 
Papadopoulos 2007; Harlow and Rawlings 2007). In many ways, the EU 
presents a distinct type of polity when compared to nation states, 
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characterised as it is by multiple, partly overlapping layers of policy making 
and multiple points of political access. Moreover political participation in 
political processes, both at the European level and within the member states is 
not limited to governments, but also includes non-state actors in civil society 
and among private firms. This development toward vertical and horizontal 
networks in EU policy making has given rise to notions of a ‘multilevel’ 
polity when discussing the EU. The multi-levelness and interconnections 
between not only formal institutions but also individual actors and networks 
is an intrinsic part of the manner in which the EU conducts its business. 
Actors are not nested within one level but cross over into other levels or 
arenas without there necessarily being any clarity as to their authority or links 
back to their original level. In other words the degree to which we can 
sustain our analysis in terms of distinct levels may be open to question. 
How can we best conceptualise ‘accountability’ in order to study it empirically? 
Accountability is a broad term that reflects a range of understandings rather 
than a single paradigm. Until recently, accountability was not a term in 
common use, nor did it figure as a term of art outside the financial contexts 
of accountancy and audit. What can be designated the original or ‘core’ sense 
of accountability is that associated with the process of being called “to 
account” to some authority for one’s actions. In the context of a democratic 
state, the key accountability relationships in this core sense are those between 
citizens and the holders of public office, and within the ranks of office 
holders, between elected politicians and bureaucrats. In a delegation model of 
accountability, relationships are established as a means of carrying out the 
delegation of tasks and the communication of expectations. 
Accountability can be construed as an important organizing principle of 
democracy resting upon specific standardized procedures. It is as a concept 
relatively uncontested in the sense that everyone intuitively agrees that public 
institutions or authorities should render account publicly for the use of their 
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mandates and the manner in which public money is spent. Accountability 
forces power to speak the truth, at least in ideal terms. However, its evocative 
powers make it also a very elusive concept because it can mean many 
different things to different people, as anyone studying accountability will 
soon discover (Bovens 2006). Bovens (2006) has defined accountability as a 
social relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor explains 
his conduct and gives information to the forum, in which the forum can 
reach a judgment or render an assessment of that conduct, and on which it 
may be possible for some form of sanction (formal or informal) to be imposed 
on the actor. The attractiveness of this definition for many of those working 
on accountability related issues is that it provides a clear procedural and 
organizational framework with a focus on the relationship between the actor, 
potentially any actor (including for example actors that can never be 
understood as agents, such as networks) and an accountability forum, 
potentially any kind of accountability forum (it can be legal, administrative, 
financial as well as the more obviously political). In addition it limits the focus 
of accountability to the ex post and to those mechanisms that provide in 
some manner for the imposition of sanctions or consequences in a looser, not 
strictly legal, sense.  
The more limited understanding of accountability as a social 
relationship between an actor and a forum is an excellent way of linking 
actors, any actors and accountability forums, irrespective of the grand 
constitutional design. Moreover the fact that accountability is given a precise 
definition makes it possible to operationalise it in very specific institutional 
contexts and to study empirically the practices of accountability with regard 
to various forums (courts, parliaments, auditors, ombudsmen, etc.). Quite a 
number of those working on accountability in the EU context take the 
Bovens definition as their point of departure precisely because it enables them 
to take account of actors and forums that are not necessarily in any delegation 
relationship (Benz 2007; Papadopoulous 2007; Harlow and Rawlings 2007). 
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This has been a useful way forward, making it possible to focus how 
accountability practices are actually institutionalised in practice in the 
European multilevel polity.  
Accountability practices in the EU multi-level governance context 
The most interesting finding from our work on EU multi-level governance 
systems relates to the wide variety of actors that can be studied in terms of 
their relationship as a matter of legal, institutional and empirical practice with 
a wide variety of accountability forums. They vary from very formal and 
institutionalised actors to much less institutionalised forums (for example 
networks). One finding that arose out of the study of the practices of 
accountability in the context of various EU level actors was that we must not 
only focus on accountability practices of European level institutions at the 
level of the EU political system itself but also at the level of the national 
political systems. National representatives or ‘agents’ are still embedded in 
hierarchical chains of accountability in the national context although 
empirical work shows that as a matter of practice national civil servants may 
enjoy considerable autonomy in organizing their own work and input at the 
EU level (Brandsma 2007).  
But national principal-agent relationships are still in place in a number 
of national systems and that this part of the accountability equation can in any 
event not be discounted. As a matter of fact, governments must negotiate on 
their mandates with parliaments and this is usually done under discretion at 
the expense of transparency (Auel 2007). Carol Harlow and Richard 
Rawlings (2007) show that not only courts and ombudsmen institutions play 
today an important role in ensuring the accountability of rules in multi-level 
systems, but also that for accountability to operate efficiently this requires the 
establishment of networks of accountability (enabling exchange of 
information and cooperation between the EU and the national levels). In 
addition work carried out in the context of the legal dimension of 
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accountability highlighted the fact that the concept can also be usefully 
applied in the context of the international legal order and its multilevel 
interactions with both the legal order of the EU and national legal orders 
(Curtin and Nollkaemper 2007; Wessel and Wouters 2008). In addition it is 
emerging that the EU is developing an autonomous role in defending the 
rule of law where the international legal order fails to do so, in the interests of 
individuals whose rights and interests have been affected (as for example is the 
case with regard to freezing of assets of terrorists legislation adopted by the 
UN Security Council in the aftermath of 11 September 2001). Our 
experience has highlighted the need for – and the interest in – even more 
intense inter-disciplinary collaboration between political scientists and public 
lawyers of all levels.  
Without being able here to systematically review all the interesting 
results from the work of RG2, the innovative empirical research that was 
conducted indicated the empirical limits of the classic concept of (democratic) 
accountability and led the group to a more refined approach on the way 
accountability operates in what is a complex and multi-level system of 
governance.  
The Citizens’ Perception of Accountability 
(Michael Marsh, Trinity College Dublin) 
RG3 dealt with key issues of democratic legitimacy in a representative 
system: political parties and party groups in parliament, elections, political 
identity and support. Researchers concentrated on data based analyses to 
explore the effects of enlargement on the cohesion and distinctiveness of 
European parties and party groups in the European Parliament and also on 
electoral participation in EP elections. They investigated if the European 
public sphere meets the necessary conditions for competitive EP elections and 
to what extend the EP electoral process is structured by EU issues. Another 
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concern was the identification of European citizens with the EU as a political 
community and the readiness of citizens to accept the citizens of other EU 
states as their fellow citizens. Do levels of mutual trust vary over time and 
across countries? Do they differ significantly different between ‘old’ member 
states and the ‘new’ member states? And how can one explain variation in 
citizens’ perceptions of the benefits in the EU? 
The effects of enlargement on cohesion and distinctiveness of European parties/EP 
groups 
European Parliament (EP) groups are remarkably distinct and cohesive. They 
are more distinct than national parties and equally cohesive. The major 
dimension on which EP party groups are distinct is the left-right dimension, 
although there are also systematic differences in how party groups position 
themselves on the integration-independence dimension. Enlargement did not 
affect cohesiveness and distinctiveness of EP groups on either the left-right or 
the EU dimension, but big differences exist on libertarian issues. These 
findings are supported by data pertaining to different political actors 
(Schmitt/Thomassen 2006). 
The impact of enlargement on the heterogeneity of the European electorate 
When looking at the distributions of electoral participation, the diversity of 
the European electorate seems to have increased with the 2004 enlargement 
of the EU. As a case in point: for the ‘old’ 15 member states in 2004 turnout 
ranges between 38% and 91%, while the addition of the 10 new member 
states increases this range to 17%-91% (Franklin 2007). Such a straightforward 
comparison cannot be made for party choice, as the set of competing parties 
is unique for each of the member states. Yet, when looking at choices in 
terms of European Parliament party groups, there are also distinct differences 
between the ‘old’ 15 and the 10 ‘new’ member states. Voters in the new 
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member states supported the European Socialists in much smaller proportions 
than elsewhere.  
Similarly, we also find strong differences in terms of other characteristics 
that are known to be important for electoral participation and party choice: 
citizens in new member states identify much less frequently with a political 
party than those in the older member states, etc. (Schmitt 2005). At first sight, 
then, one might be inclined to say that the 2004 enlargement has increased 
the heterogeneity of the European electorate (Schmitt 2005). Yet, such a 
conclusion would be misleading for two reasons. First, such a comparison 
would –incorrectly – suggest that the ‘old’ 15 and the ‘new’ 10 member-
states themselves are homogeneous. In terms of turnout, for example, Cyprus 
and Malta look more similar to Belgium, Italy and Luxembourg than that 
they resemble, e.g., Latvia or Hungary, which themselves are more similar to 
Portugal and France. In all kinds of ways the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ member 
states are quite diverse groupings which happen to differ on average, but 
where the internal heterogeneity of each group is so large as to render such 
averages to be more misleading than informative.  
The second reason why we should not conclude that the 2004 
enlargement has increased the heterogeneity of the European electorate is that 
the determinants of electoral participation and of party choice are exceedingly 
similar across all member states of the Union, old and new ones alike (Van 
der Brug/Franklin/Tóka 2006). In other words, when comparing citizens in 
new member-states with counterparts in older member-states we see very 
little differences between them, if any (van der Brug/Franklin/Tóka 2006). 
The apparent differences in citizens’ behaviour and orientations that are 
manifest at the surface are the consequence of different historical legacies, of 
different stages of economic development, and of different forms of political 
organisation in their respective countries. But they do not indicate that these 
citizens are of a different nature, or that the factors that determine their 
behaviours and choices are different.  
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European public sphere and the conditions for competitive EP elections  
The good news is that elections are gaining in visibility in the news, there are 
more European actors in the news stories about the EP than before. Euro 
sceptic political parties seem to drive some of this increase so in a sense the 
conditions for a competitive election are emerging. But it has to be noted 
that the political cleavages that show up are ‘Europe pro-con’ rather than 
policy cleavages (De Vreese 2006). 
To what extent is the EP electoral process structured by EU issue concerns? 
The traditional answer to the first part of this question, embodied in the 
concept of EP elections as ‘second order national elections’, is ‘not much’. 
Furthermore, in most EU countries there has been broad consensus about 
integration between the main parties. There are significant exceptions to the 
general conclusion, most notably in the case of Denmark. It is also true that 
in 2004 Euro-sceptic and even outright anti-EU parties won their best results 
ever. Even so, it was as clear in 2004 as it was in 1979 that the results of EP 
elections could be predicted very effectively from the national circumstances 
of the contending national parties (Schmitt 2005). Yet there are ways in 
which it can be said ‘Europe matters’. First, and most notably, in as much as 
national competition is, perhaps increasingly, influenced by EU issues then 
there is an EU influenced structure to national competition which will be 
reflected in EP elections. There are ways in which EU issues generate conflict 
which overlap with traditional cleavages: the immigration issue is a case in 
point. There are also EU issues which may cut across old left right divides, 
but they, too, can be part of national level competition (Schmitt 2007). 
Secondly, there is evidence that EU concerns have motivated a minority of 
voters to switch allegiances between national and EP elections. Finally, it has 
always been the case that many issues discussed in the EP fall on a more 
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traditional left right scale and so are reflected in the make-up of parties in the 
EP (Schmitt/Thomassen 2006).  
Enlargement has had some impact on the answer to this question in as 
much as the parameters of a second order election model seem to be different 
in the new accession countries, at least taken as a whole. It also seems clear 
that in at least some of them, the EU issue is a highly salient one for electoral 
competition. Even so, EP election results can still be predicted reasonably 
well from national ones (Marsh 2007). 
The citizens’ identification with EU as a political community 
Three indicators were used for European identity. First, the willingness of 
EU citizens to accept all other citizens of the (enlarged) Union as their fellow 
citizens and to accept that all EU-citizens are therefore entitled to all rights 
that come with the citizenship of the Union. A second indicator of an 
emerging political community is the extent to which people do consider 
themselves as citizens of the European Union. A third indicator is mutual 
trust.  
In general people from the older member states are more inclined to 
accept the consequences of European citizenship, i.e. to accept that European 
citizenship implies equal rights across national borders. However, it is 
unlikely that this is a direct consequence of the duration of membership. The 
findings of RG3 suggest that the higher level of economic development and 
the longer tradition of liberal democracy in Western Europe are a better 
explanation for these differences (Scheuer/Schmitt 2007). In general the 
people from the new member states in Central and Eastern Europe are less 
inclined to see themselves as European citizens than people in the older 
member states, but this is not a uniform pattern. The differences between 
some of the founding member states are as large as between any other pair of 
countries (Thomassen 2007). In Western Europe mutual trust in general is 
high and has increased over the years but there is little evidence that this is 
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due to European Union membership. Among the citizens of the older 
member states trust in the people of at least some of the accession countries, 
not to speak of (then) candidate countries like Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey 
is extremely low (Scheuer/Schmitt 2007).  
Citizens’ support of EU institutions 
In contrast to general expectations, trust in European governmental 
institutions and, in particular, the European Parliament, is higher in the 
present decade than in the 1990s. Whereas the European Commission and 
the Council of Ministers faced declining trust between 1993 and 1999, but 
recovered fast, the European Parliament continuously gained support. 
However, there is a dramatic drop in trust between the Spring and Autumn 
of 2004. This development coincided with the Eastern enlargement and the 
signing of the Constitutional Treaty in Rome in October of that year. In the 
period from 1993 to Spring 2004, trust in national institutions was higher 
than in European ones in no more than four of the fifteen member states. 
From the Autumn of 2004 trust in both national parliaments and the 
European Parliament increased somewhat whereas trust in national 
governments increased tremendously. This revival of trust in national 
institutions is probably due to enlargement and the discussion about the 
European Constitution. 
It seems to be a stable pattern that citizens in the new member states 
trust European institutions more than do citizens in the old member states. In 
contrast, trust in national institutions is considerably lower in new than in 
older member states. Also, since 2004 trust in national governments in the 
new member states has dramatically declined, making the gap between new 
and old member states even wider (Thomassen 2007). 
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The citizens’ satisfaction with EU policies 
Over time, citizens’ perceptions of benefits from the EU have first risen, then 
fallen, and now seem to be rising again. This is not simply a consequence of 
the changing composition of EU or the latest accession wave. In fact, this sort 
of pattern is characteristic of most waves of accession. There is also no sign of 
growing diversity in national reactions to the EU (Marsh/Mikhaylov 2008). 
In looking to explain these variations we find that utilitarian considerations 
matter. Direct utilitarian benefits in terms of trade and transfer payments are 
associated with variation, as are changes in national economic performance, 
with the EU seemingly rewarded for good times. A very simple, purely 
utilitarian, model is quite good at explaining the cyclical pattern at an 
aggregate level. Such an explanation is also consistent across different 
accession waves (and not only the latest enlargement round). Only two 
countries prove to be major exceptions to the utilitarian model of support for 
EU policies. One is the Netherlands, where the gradual disenchantment with 
the benefits of membership since the early 1990s is not reflected in the 
underlying material changes. A more striking exception, and the most striking 
negative result, is the case of the UK. There, support has fallen since the early 
1980s, and fallen sharply from the relative heights achieved in the early 1990s. 
Predictions from the model suggest support should have risen steadily, rather 
than fallen steadily from around 1993.  
Civil Society and Interest Representation in EU-
Governance 
(Beate Kohler-Koch, University of Mannheim) 
The transformation of the European nation state is said to go along with the 
decline of electoral and party politics and the migration of the ‘authoritative 
allocation of values’ into policy networks and negotiation systems in which 
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interest groups and civil society organisations assume prominent positions. 
Consequently, interest groups and civil society are well established on the 
social science research agenda but dealt with by different research 
communities. Furthermore, empirical research was for a long time scattered 
across disciplinary and policy specific research fields with little cross-cutting 
intellectual exchange. Therefore, RG4 engaged in a concerted effort to link 
the debate on the alleged biased representation of interest groups in the EU 
with research on the promised benefits of civil society involvement in EU 
governance. RG4 did not shy away from methodological challenges but took 
up the thorny issue of measuring influence and aimed at making sense of the 
divergent concepts of civil society and the diverse functional roles attributed 
to civil society in EU governance. Empirical research concentrated on the 
Commission’s efforts to enhance democracy by empowering civil society 
both within the EU and abroad.   
Biased representation in the EU 
It is a common criticism that the EU is plagued by biased representation and 
that economic interests enjoy privileged influence on EU policies. But on 
closer scrutiny there is little agreement on the kind of empirical data that is 
needed to support or refute the common supposition. If empirical evidence 
supports the assumption, how do we explain the persistence of biased 
representation? 
A state of the art evaluation of interest groups in EU policy-making 
(Eising 2008) went together with comparative research on interest group 
influence (Dür/DeBièvre 2007). The challenge of trying to measure 
influence was deliberately taken up (Dür 2008). ‘Access’ and ‘inclusion’ are 
mostly taken as proxies but this approach provides little information on 
‘effective participation’ which – according to Dahl – is the relevant criterion 
for assessing the democratic nature of decision making. ‘Biased representation’ 
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only makes sense when linked to the capacity of having an impact on policy 
outcomes.  
Empirical research on European trade policy gives evidence that civil 
society organisations of all different kinds have gained access to policy-
makers. However, these representatives of general interests have largely failed 
to shift policy outcomes in their favour. This does not result from the 
overwhelming presence of focused producer interests since numbers do not 
necessarily count in international negotiations. The explanatory factor is 
neither the lack of expert knowledge but a lack of resources in terms of not 
being able to diminish or enhance the chances of political actors to be re-
elected or re-appointed.  
In order to draw a full picture of interest representation and influence, 
researchers further have to take into account that interest groups aim not only 
at policy influence but also at maintaining their organization. The 
participation in consultations may be attractive for gathering information and 
expertise, for cultivating political networks, and for enhancing public 
visibility vis-à-vis key constituencies. Thus, while much lobbying could easily 
be viewed as ineffective in terms of shaping policy outcomes, this may 
underestimate the usefulness of the lobbying effort from the perspective of 
maintaining the organisation. 
Is civil society a remedy to the perceived legitimacy crisis of the EU? 
The positive image of civil society has many roots: the legacy of civil society 
in the peaceful transformation to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, 
the recourse to NGOs as active representatives of general values and of rights 
based interests in global governance, the dissemination in academia of 
theories which attribute to civil society a key role in rejuvenating democracy 
such as public sphere and deliberate democracy theories and comparative 
associationalism. 
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Comparative research (Jobert/Kohler-Koch 2008) scrutinised the 
varieties of civil society concepts and supports the hypothesis that the 
recourse to civil society is more often than not a response to profound 
legitimacy crisis while also having an instrumental value (Edler-
Wollstein/Kohler-Koch 2008). The EU is no exception (Michel 2008): The 
discourse on civil society draws, mostly implicitly, on many divergent 
concepts and, consequently, promises the cure of all kind of deficiencies. 
Thus, the involvement of civil society as propagated by EU institutions, 
above all by the Commission, is meant to foster both input and output 
legitimacy (Finke 2007; Kohler-Koch/Finke 2007). However, institutional 
factors and the reality of associational life in Europe channel how these ideas 
are put into practise.  
It is widely acknowledged that the diversity in political cultures, 
languages and national allegiances in Europe are obstacles to the emergence 
of a trans-national civil society. Less noticed are the effects of civil society 
changes at member state level. Even in Scandinavia, which used to be a 
model of association based democracy, the organisation of civil society has 
converted from mass member based associations which served as transmission 
belts of collective interests to government into a more pluralist associational 
life serving individual interests (Wollebæk/Selle 2008). As the Scandinavian 
model is even in decline in the countries of origin, we can hardly expect its 
re-invigoration in the EU. Rather, the EU is faced by a pluralist system of 
highly professional organisations in which value and rights based civil society 
organisations compete with a wide range of social and economic interests 
groups (Kohler-Koch 2008a).  
When trying to assess the democratic value of civil society engagement, 
we have to take into account that normative benchmarks vary with 
theoretical approaches. The discourse on EU-civil society relations was 
heavily influenced by normative theories advocating deliberative democracy 
and the value of a European public sphere. Following this approach, 
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empirical research explored the contribution of civil society to greater 
reciprocity and publicity in EU decision making (Hüller/Kohler-Koch 2008). 
Involving civil society: A contribution to participatory democracy? 
The European Commission has pledged to bring the EU closer to the people 
by redesigning EU governance. How did it translate the high principles of 
European governance - openness, participation, transparency, and 
accountability – in strategies and instruments? And did the new ‘consultation 
regime’ effectively support weak interests and enhance the democratic input 
to European governance? 
Since the turn of the century, EU institutions, above all the 
Commission, have been active to provide citizens with more opportunities to 
participate effectively in policy-making. In close cooperation with NGOs and 
the Commission researchers investigated the variety of approaches, the 
different uses of instruments and the divergent effects at different levels of 
government. The Commission has introduced a new ‘consultation regime’ 
that has effectively widened participation by lowering the threshold of access; 
it has increased transparency and has lent support to the representation of 
weak interests (Quittkat/Finke 2008). Notwithstanding all these efforts, equal 
representation has not been achieved, neither in terms of types of interests 
nor in relation to territorial origin (Persson 2007). Representativeness and 
accountability are truncated due to the multi-level character of EU 
governance (Hüller/Kohler-Koch 2008) and due to the organisational 
features of concerted civil society representation, which is a response to 
growing interest group competition (Kohler-Koch 2008a). Furthermore, the 
commitment of the Commission to evidence based decision-making gives 
preference to expert knowledge and puts political, value oriented debates 
second. 
However, the participatory discourse has clearly raised the awareness for 
the need of input legitimacy. Though the out-spoken commitment to ‘the 
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principle of participatory democracy’ in the Constitutional Treaty is not part 
of the Reform Treaty, procedural reforms have been introduced that provide 
for more transparency and responsiveness. Comparing the first with the 
second pillar of the EU, it is evident that civil society involvement in foreign 
and security policies is less in the spot light but research reveals that it is still 
very present. Although the institutions and governance styles in the two 
pillars make a difference, variations in policy issues and types of conflicts have 
shown more discernible impacts on the kind and degree of civil society 
involvement (Dembowski/Joachim 2008). 
The Europeanisation of national civil societies 
In line with the pledge ‘to bring Europe closer to the people’ the 
Commission has reached out to national civil society organisations and 
decreed their inclusion in the formulation and implementation of sectoral 
policies. The way in which the demands and arguments of civic groups are 
taken into account evolves in the course of this interaction. It is heavily 
influenced by the regulatory object and by the regulatory public 
(O’Mahony/Coffey 2007). Furthermore, detailed case studies reveal a two 
way effect: civil society involvement changes the perception of the 
responsible General Directorate of its own role in such public participation 
exercises and it contributes to the Europeanisation of involved interest 
groups. Europeanisation, however, does not result from the ‘teaching 
exercise’ of the Commission’s communication policy, nor does it follow the 
functional logic of shifting loyalties; it rather comes about as a ‘banal 
Europeanism’ caused by the ‘enhabitation’ of the EU at an every day level 
(Cram 2006).  
The EU as ‘external democratizer’ 
The promotion of ‘good governance’ and democracy is a prime objective of 
the EU’s foreign policy. The strengthening of civil society is considered both 
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as an end in itself and as a device to bring about political reform. Empirical 
research reveals that the EU has not a clear conception of civil society when 
it sets out to promote democracy in third states by empowering civil society. 
A comparative investigation of the choice of instruments and partners 
documents that the EU is often trapped by the dilemma of having to choose 
between societal organisations which are closely associated with government 
and organisations in opposition to the (authoritarian) government. 
Apparently, this is a choice between, on the one hand, short term political 
stability and a possibly long-term transition to democracy and, on the other 
hand, a more conflict prone process that may bring about change more 
rapidly but with the risk of instability and political turmoil. Irrespective of all 
the differences that accrue from different national situations, democracy 
promotion through civil society support turned out to be a fly-by-night 
instrument that was used with ever greater hesitation over time. 
Social Capital as Catalyst of Civic Engagement and Quality 
of Governance 
(Frane Adam, University of Ljubljana) 
RG5 comprised three research teams. The first group addressed the topic of 
social capital and governance in old and new EU-member states, paying 
special attention to national elites and their (trans-European) networks. The 
second examined the question of civil society and multi-level governance 
focussing on a possible move from national toward international linkages, and 
the third investigated the EU contributions to civil society development in 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
To what extent has there been an Europeanization of Civil Society? 
One of the major aims of Research Group 5 was to integrate top-down 
approaches for the study of relationships within the developing EU-multilevel 
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system (i.e. the consequences of Europeanisation for civil society at the local 
level) and bottom-up approaches (i.e. the consequences of civil society for 
the process of European integration and democracy in the EU). The 
combination of various research perspectives and approaches demonstrated 
that the linkages in the European multi-level system are characterised by 
national features and developments and that voluntary associations have a 
very limited capacity to enhance meaningful political linkages between the 
EU and its citizens. The linkages are heavily influenced by national elites who 
play a key gatekeeper role to exert top-down control. 
The Europeanisation process in terms of civil society actors adapting to the 
European political space has been somewhat uneven. Engagement with, and 
confidence in, the EU (compared to national institutions) is relatively weak 
exactly among the group of citizens that the social capital model predicts would 
be highest – members of voluntary associations. (Attitudes towards Europe and 
European institutions among activists are not much more positive than those 
found among the general populations.) Consequently, because support for the 
EU is weak among citizens active at the local level bottom-up engagement at the 
EU level is unlikely to emerge. Thus, the social capital being generated in EU 
democracies is nation-centred: i.e. values and trust are heavily oriented to 
national societies and political systems. Consequently, there appears to be a deficit 
in the stock of social capital required that could contribute to ‘good’ EU 
governance and enhance political legitimation. Combining various perspectives 
made clear that linkages in the European multi-level system are: (i) evidently 
characterised by national features and developments, (ii) only, in rather restricted 
ways, ascertained by voluntary associations, and (iii) heavily influenced by 
national elites who are able to control top-down linkages. (Maloney/van Deth 
2008). In contrast to the empirical findings on the local level, other RG5 research 
indicated an increasing interest in European affairs among civic organizations 
organised on trans-national (trans-European) level. It seems that the capacity of 
national civic organizations as well as citizens of the EU to get engaged in trans-
40 Beate Kohler-Koch
 
national civic organizations on the EU level varies greatly among EU members. 
(Adam 2007).  
The transformation of civil society organizations on the European level into advocacy 
groups 
Research findings in Research Group 5 (and other CONNEX groups) chart 
the apparently inexorable trend towards the professionalization of 
representation. The professionalization of European NGOs and associations 
have been characterised by a shift to service provision with management and 
expertise increasing in importance leading to a strengthening of the leadership 
vis-à-vis the membership: i.e. leading to a weakening of political linkage. 
While the ‘power balance’ may be tipping towards leaders there remains a 
necessity for an active core of members who can be mobilized when 
required. For some scholars these changes may signal a shift away from 
democratic aspirations and/or expectations. However, from the group 
perspective it is a necessary response to trans-nationalisation processes and the 
multi-level policy-making system of the EU. Professionalization and 
bureaucratization appear to be inevitable if NGOs are to effectively represent 
their interests and influence outcomes. These developments may ultimately 
result in a segmented and hierarchically structured civil society offering 
decreasing levels of political linkage and leading to the development of new 
civil society elite. The discussion concerning the transformation of NGOs’ – 
especially when active on the European level – into advocacy groups in 
which managerial, lobbyist, communication and cognitive competencies are 
more important than grass-root activism was a recurring topic in joint 
discussions. A new market niche has been opened for such organisations - 
providing practical expertise and knowledge. It was agreed that comparative 
European studies would benefit from bringing the activities of trans-national 
NGOs more into focus.  
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The impact of EU’s democratization strategies on civil society organizations in “third” 
states 
Research on democratization promotion by the EU challenged the ‘one size 
fits all’ approach. Different strategies for the promotion of civil society in 
external states can be observed and the EU akin to other external actors faced 
significant problems in adequately taking the local contexts into account. 
There were problems with regard to the funding programmes and 
democratization instruments. EU funding of civil society tended to privilege a 
few large and well-connected NGOs and smaller and geographically dispersed 
organizations became the poorer relatives. The EU also tended to draw on 
large resource rich NGOs as ‘administrative partners’ and the increasingly 
complexity of policy-making and funding acts as a further barrier to the 
development of resource poor and smaller NGOs. These developments are 
likely to lead to greater hierarchy and stratification within civil society (Susan 
Stewart 2009).  
The Transformation of the European Policy Space 
(Renaud Dehousse, Sciences-Po, Paris) 
RG6 concentrated research on four core questions: Are New Modes of 
Governance (NMG) an alternative to the ‘Community method’? How can 
one assess the crucial role of experts of all kinds in EU policy making? How 
democratically legitimate are soft modes of governance? To what extend are 
new modes of governance EU-specific? Concerning the significance of the 
emergence and development of NMG it has been open to debate whether 
they suggest the demise of the old system or whether they simply represent a 
fist step of a new era of EU governance. Closely related is the question 
whether the emergence of NMG is a response to specific problems faced by 
the EU or rather the innovative response of the EU to problems common to 
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most public actors of our time. Equally disputed is the need of and possible 
mechanisms to supply democratic legitimacy.  
New Modes of Governance and the ‘Community method’ 
New modes of governance, which were at the heart of RG6 reflections, are 
traditionally defined in opposition to the traditional “Community Method”. 
Although in-depth analyses concerning the concrete operation of the 
Community Method have been lacking, the basic principles are clearly 
identified. They include: the transfer of legislative powers to the EU, the 
creation of the European Commission as a “supranational” executive, the 
possibility of voting in order to adopt binding legislation, and enforcement 
powers are vested in the European Court of Justice. One of the most 
remarkable elements of this international regime has been its stability: 50 
years on, despite a significant enlargement of the number of member 
countries and several treaty revisions, it may be argued that the key features of 
the system have remained unchanged. New modes of governance provide a 
near-perfect mirror-image of all of these elements. Centralization is 
deliberately avoided (particularly if it entails a strengthening of the 
Commission’s powers). Uniformity is perceived as unduly burdensome: 
flexibility is the new buzzword. For the same reason, non-binding 
instruments are preferred. The development of NMG could, therefore, easily 
be seen (and is often presented) as a sign of the obsolescence of the 
Community method. 
However, the study of EU policies conducted in the framework of 
RG6 suggests that the opposition of these two models is somewhat artificial. 
Similarities are about as manifold as the differences. As a rule, EU policies are 
less centralised than those conducted in many Member States. Being the 
product of a consensus, they are often bound to be fairly flexible – hence the 
frequent resort to techniques such as minimum harmonization or opt outs. 
Moreover, the emergence of new modes of governance has not been 
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accompanied by a decline of the Community method. It is applied today in a 
larger number of areas than fifteen years ago and there has been no substantial 
decline of the volume of legislative initiatives, even after the enlargement 
(Dehousse, 2008). Legal integration has not stopped, even in areas where the 
need for diversity is acutely felt, such as social policy (Pochet 2007). NMGs 
can even be used by EU institutions in order to enhance their own influence 
(Cram, 2007). In other words, the development of new modes of governance 
does not announce a demise of the Community method. 
Assessing the crucial role of experts in EU policy-making 
Another recurrent theme in various workshops organized by RG 6 has been 
the limited role of political actors in most day-to-day decisions taken at the 
EU level. While classical international relations theory insists on the crucial 
part of ‘governments’ in EU policy-making, recent work has shed light on 
the role of two types of actors: bureaucrats and experts. Scientific experts are 
crucial actors in risk governance, whether at the level of the regulatory 
decision-making process or at the level of the courts, and the powers of the 
EU in this field have been growing steadily (Vos, 2008). Also, the problems 
linked to the tendency of law-makers to delegate part of their powers to 
different actors (whether these be administrative agencies or private bodies) 
have been addressed in several research teams. It has been shown that a ‘one 
size fits all’ approach was inconclusive: in monetary policy, for instance, the 
independence of central banks is widely regarded as indispensable, even 
though there is a lively debate on how they can be made to account for their 
decisions (Laurent/ Le Cacheux, 2006). 
Clearly, this increasing polycentricism is not specific to EU policy-
making. At the domestic level as well, policy-making is characterized by an 
ever-wider array of decision structures. Yet this trend is most likely 
reinforced by the multi-level character of the EU, which creates the need for 
coordination between all the actors in charge of a given problem, thereby 
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making it more difficult to achieve a coherent ‘national’ viewpoint on all 
issues. This trend has been partly described in the existing literature on policy 
networks. The web of EU committees has also been analyzed along these 
lines. 
It is evident that the role of non-political actors (experts and 
bureaucrats) in EU policy-making has implications on the way Europe is 
perceived by its citizens. Given the weakness of partisan cleavages at the 
European level, decision-making appears to be dominated by technocratic 
elements. The complex lines of command that exist in the EU makes it often 
nearly impossible for ordinary citizens to identify who is responsible for a 
given decision. Given the prevalence of the parliamentary model in the 
European political culture, it is not surprising to find that even technocrats 
may feel uncomfortable with this (Borras, 2008). Moreover, the de-
politicization of EU policy-making may create incentives for shifting 
responsibility for sensitive decisions to the European level in order to avoid 
political tensions at the domestic level (Palier, 2008). Clearly, discussions 
within RG6 have shown the need for a regular dialogue between policy 
studies specialists and scholars working on accountability issues or on national 
and European politics. 
The democratic legitimacy of New Modes of Governance 
While the normative qualities of soft governance arrangements are usually 
seen in their alleged higher effectiveness in attaining policy goals, serious 
concerns remain regarding their democratic legitimacy. Soft modes of 
governance may be able to shape what is perceived as “sound” policy at EU 
and domestic level, and may be used to implement Community legislation, 
thus privileging some societal interests over others. Therefore, they may 
imply, entail or legitimise an authoritative allocation of values, which makes 
their democratic legitimacy a valid concern.  
The Richness of CONNEX Research in a Nutshell 45
 
The research group identified the need to take into account the diverse 
nature of soft modes of governance, as well as the necessity to assess the 
democratic legitimacy of these governance arrangements against different 
theoretical concepts of democracy: On the one hand, new modes of 
governance might be considered as problematic from a liberal standpoint 
since they often bypass parliamentarian procedures and lack in transparency 
and accountability. On the other hand, the participatory nature of many soft 
governance arrangements can be an important source of democratic renewal 
since they might constitute alternative sources of legitimacy for the EU from 
the standpoint of deliberative conceptions of democracy. Thus, the discussion 
of the democratic legitimacy of soft modes of governance depends both, on 
the particular policy instrument at hand and the conception of democracy 
that is employed.  
A pragmatic research strategy that is considered promising in this 
context is to transform the different conceptions of democracy into a number 
of empirically identifiable “yardsticks” that can be used for assessing the 
democratic legitimacy of specific examples of soft modes of governance.  
Is the EU still unique? 
Finally, discussions within RG6 quite often stumbled upon the same 
question: to what extent are new modes of governance EU-specific? 
Comparisons between developments within EU public policies and those 
occurring at the domestic or international level have frequently been 
conducted as part of the group’s work. For instance, while one research team 
analyzed the politics of reforms of continental European welfare states”, 
another group systematically compared the EU with other international 
organizations and with the US administrative model. Such studies inevitably 
lead to the well-known n=1 problem of European studies. While many 
policy developments within the EU are similar to the changes taking place in 
other arenas (whether domestic or international), the EU itself is not a state, 
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nor a ‘classical’ international organization; it has several characteristics that are 
rarely found in other settings. Nonetheless, in the social sciences, comparisons 
are often indispensable to draw conclusions of a general nature. Is the 
development of the new modes of governance addressed in this working 
group a response to specific problems faced by the EU, or rather the EU’s 
response to problems common to most public actors of our time?   
The responses to this question were somewhat mixed. Clearly, from a 
governance perspective, the EU is not unique since, in terms of policy-
making, agenda-setting, decision-making, and evaluation, it looks like a 
political system like any other. The issues it has to address, and the 
instruments it uses, are similar to those that one may come across in other 
systems (Kassim and Le Galès, 2010). It may be affected by trends existing 
worldwide in the functioning of public administration (Boussaguet and 
Dehousse, 2008b), such as the emergence of “New Public Management”.  
However, the EU undoubtedly has some original features. Like all 
federal systems, it attempts to strike a balance between unity and diversity, 
even if the areas in which uniformity is sought are not always the same. But 
in contrast to most federal systems, member states’ governments play a central 
role in its functioning: in the words of Beate Kohler-Koch, it is a system of 
governance with governments – that is to say a system centred on steering 
those who are responsible for steering. Moreover, politics do not play the 
same role: though it has an elected Parliament, the latter is not seen as 
effective in representing the citizens’ views, and party politics do not play the 
same role as in domestic politics. All this may explain why in governance 
debates so much importance has been attached to the accountability of EU 
institutions. 
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Notes 
1 See the list of CONNEX publications http://www.mzes.uni-
mannheim.de/projekte/typo3/site/index.php?id=37 
2 Apart from the short introductory paragraph the presentation of the findings was drafted by 
the Research Group Coordinators. 
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